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We study the evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity, believed to constitute the biological basis of morality.
We employ an evolutionary game theoretical model of multilevel selection, and show that natural selection and
mutation lead to the emergence of a robust and simple social norm, which we call stern-judging. Under stern-judging,
helping a good individual or refusing help to a bad individual leads to a good reputation, whereas refusing help to a
good individual or helping a bad one leads to a bad reputation. Similarly for tit-for-tat and win-stay-lose-shift, the
simplest ubiquitous strategies in direct reciprocity, the lack of ambiguity of stern-judging, where implacable
punishment is compensated by prompt forgiving, supports the idea that simplicity is often associated with
evolutionary success.
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Introduction
Many biological systems employ cooperative interactions in
their organization [1]. Humans, unlike other animal species,
form large social groups in which cooperation among non-
kin is widespread. This contrasts with the general assumption
that the strong and selfish individuals are the ones who
benefit most from natural selection. This being the case, how
is it possible that unselfish behaviour has survived evolution?
Adopting the terminology resulting from the seminal work of
Hamilton, Trivers, and Wilson [2–4], an act is altruistic if it
confers a benefit b to another individual in spite of accruing a
cost c to the altruist (where it is assumed, as usual, that b . c).
In this context, several mechanisms have been invoked to
explain the evolution of altruism, but only recently an
evolutionary model of indirect reciprocity (using the termi-
nology introduced by [5]) has been developed by Nowak and
Sigmund [6], which, with remarkable simplicity, addressed
‘‘unique aspects of human sociality, such as trust, gossip, and
reputation’’ [7]. As a means of community enforcement,
indirect reciprocity had been investigated earlier in the
context of economics, notably by Sugden [8] and Kandori [9]
(see below). More recently, many studies [7,8,10–17] have been
devoted to investigating how altruism can evolve under
indirect reciprocity. Indeed, according to Alexander [5],
indirect reciprocity presumably provides the mechanism that
distinguishes us humans from all other living species on
Earth. Moreover, as recently argued in [10], ‘‘indirect
reciprocity may have provided the selective challenge driving
the cerebral expansion in human evolution.’’ In the indirect
reciprocity game, any two players are supposed to interact at
most once with each other, one in the role of a potential
donor, with the other as a potential receiver of help. Each
player can experience many rounds, but never with the same
partner twice, direct retaliation being unfeasible. By helping
another individual, a given player may increase (or not) her
reputation, which may change the predisposition of others to
help her in future interactions. However, her new reputation
depends on the social norm used by her peers to assess her
action as a donor. Previous studies of reputation-based
models of cooperation reviewed recently [10] indicate that
cooperation outweighs defection whenever, among other
factors, assessment of actions is based on norms that require
considerable cognitive capacities [10,12,13], even when
individuals are capable of making binary assessments only,
in a ‘‘world in black and white’’ [10], as assumed in most
recent studies (see, however, [6]). Furthermore, stable
cooperation hinges on the availability of reliable reputation
information [6]. Such high cognitive capacity contrasts with
technology-based interactions, such as e-trade, which also rely
on reputation-based mechanisms of cooperation [18–20].
Indeed, anonymous one-shot interactions between individu-
als loosely connected and geographically dispersed usually
dominate e-trade, raising issues of trust-building and moral
hazard [21]. Reputation in e-trade is introduced via a
feedback mechanism which announces the ratings of sellers.
Despite the success and high levels of cooperation observed
in e-trade, it has been found [18] that publicizing a detailed
account of the seller’s feedback history does not improve
cooperation, as compared with publicizing only the seller’s
most recent rating. In other words, practice shows that simple
reputation-based mechanisms are capable of promoting high
levels of cooperation. In view of the previous discussion, it is
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hard to explain the success of e-trade on the basis of the
results obtained so far for reputation-based cooperation in
the context of indirect reciprocity.
A Model of Multilevel, Multigame Selection
Let us consider a world in black and white consisting of a
set of tribes, such that each tribe lives under the influence of a
single norm, common to all individuals (see Figure 1). Each
individual engages once in the indirect reciprocity game (cf.
Methods) with all other tribe inhabitants. Her action as a
donor will depend on her individual strategy, which dictates
whether she will provide help or refuse to do it depending on her
and the recipient’s reputation. Reputations are public: this
means that the result of every interaction is made available to
everyone through the ‘‘indirect observation model’’ intro-
duced in [13] (see also [15]). This allows any individual to
know the current status of the co-player without observing all
of her past interactions. On the other hand, this requires a
way to spread the information (even with errors) to the entire
population (communication/language). Consistently, lan-
guage seems to be an important cooperation promoter [22],
although recent mechanisms of reputation-spreading rely on
electronic databases (e.g., in e-trade, where reputation of
sellers is centralized). Since reputations are either GOOD or
BAD, there are 24¼ 16 possible strategies. On the other hand,
the number of possible norms depends on their associated
order. The simplest are the so-called first-order norms, in which
all that matters is the action taken by the donor. In second-
order norms, the reputation of one of the players (donor or
recipient) also contributes to decide the new reputation of
the donor. And so on, in increasing layers of complexity (and
associated requirements of cognitive capacities from individ-
uals) as shown in Figure 2, which illustrates the features of
third-order norms such as those we shall employ here. Any
individual in the tribe shares the same norm, which in turn
raises the question of how each inhabitant acquired it. We do
not address this issue here. However, inasmuch as indirect
reciprocity is associated with ‘‘community enforcement’’
[9,10], one may assume, for simplicity, that norms are
acquired through an educational process. Moreover, it is
likely that a common norm contributes to the overall
cohesiveness and identity of a tribe. It is noteworthy,
however, that if norms were different for different individ-
uals, the ‘‘indirect observation model’’ would not be valid, as
it requires trust in judgments made by co-inhabitants. For a
norm of order n, there are 22
n
possible norms, each associated
with a binary string of length 2n. We consider third-order
norms (8-bit strings, Figure 2): in assessing a donor’s new
reputation, the observer has to make a contextual judgment
involving the donor’s action, as well as her and the recipient’s
Figure 1. Multilevel Selection Model for the Evolution of Norms
Each palette represents a tribe in which inhabitants (coloured dots) employ different strategies (different colours) to play the indirect reciprocity game.
Each tribe is influenced by a single social norm (common background colour), which may be different in different tribes. All individuals in each tribe
undergo pairwise rounds of the game (lower level of selection, Level 1), whereas all tribes also engage in pairwise conflicts (higher level of selection,
Level 2), as described in the main text. As a result of the conflicts between tribes, norms evolve, whereas evolution inside each tribe selects the
distribution of strategies that best adapt to the ruling social norm in each tribe.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020178.g001
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Synopsis
Humans, unlike other animal species, form large social groups in
which cooperation among non-kin is widespread. This contrasts
with the general assumption that the strong and selfish individuals
are the ones who benefit most from natural selection. Among the
different mechanisms invoked to explain the evolution of cooper-
ation, indirect reciprocity is associated with cooperation supported
by reputation: I help you and someone else helps me. However, how
did reputation evolve and which type of moral is encapsulated in
those social norms that are evolutionary successful? Suggesting a
simple scenario for the evolution of social norms, Pacheco, Santos,
and Chalub propose a reputation-based multilevel selection model,
where individual behaviour and moral systems co-evolve, governed
by competition and natural selection. Evolution leads to the
emergence of a simple and robust social norm, which the authors
call stern-judging, where implacable punishment goes side-by-side
with prompt forgiving. The low level of complexity of this norm,
which is supported by empirical observations in e-trade, conveys the
idea that simplicity is often associated with evolutionary success.
Stern-Judging: A Norm That Promotes Cooperation
reputations scored in the previous action. We introduce the
following evolutionary dynamics in each tribe: during one
generation all individuals interact once with each other via
the indirect reciprocity game. When individuals ‘‘reproduce,’’
they replace their strategy by that of another individual from
the same tribe, chosen proportional to her accumulated
payoff [12]. The most successful individuals in each tribe have
a higher reproductive success. Since different tribes are
‘‘under the influence’’ of different norms, the overall fitness
of each tribe will vary from tribe to tribe, as well as the
plethora of successful strategies that thrive in each tribe
(Figure 1). This describes individual selection in each tribe
(Level 1 in Figure 1).
Tribes engage in pairwise conflicts with a small probability,
associated with selection between tribes. After each conflict,
the norm of the defeated tribe will change toward the norm
of the victor tribe, as detailed in the Methods section (Level 2
in Figure 1). We consider different forms of conflict between
tribes, which reflect different types of inter-tribe selection
mechanisms: group selection [5,23–28] based on the average
global payoff of each tribe (involving different selection
processes and intensities; imitation dynamics, a Moran-like
process; and the pairwise comparison process, the latter
discussed in Protocol S1) as well as selection resulting from
inter-tribe conflicts modeled in terms of games—the display
game of war of attrition, and an extended hawk–dove game
[14] (see Protocol S1). We perform extensive computer
simulations of evolutionary dynamics of sets of 64 tribes,
each with 64 inhabitants. Once a stationary regime is reached,
we collect information for subsequent statistical analysis (cf.
Methods). We compute the frequency of occurrence of bits 1
and 0 in each of the 8-bit locations. A bit is said to fixate if its
frequency of occurrence exceeds or equals 98%. Otherwise,
no fixation occurs, which we denote by X, instead of by 1 or 0.
We analyze 500 simulations for the same value of b,
subsequently computing the frequency of occurrence u1, u0,
and uX of the bits 1, 0, and X, respectively. If u1 . u0þuX, the
final bit is 1; if u0 . u1 þ uX, the final bit is 0; otherwise we
assume it is indeterminate, and denote it by . It is
noteworthy that our bit-by-bit selection/transmission proce-
dure, though artificial, provides a simple means of mimicking
biological evolution, where genes are interconnected by
complex networks and yet evolve independently. Certainly,
a co-evolutionary process would be more appropriate (and
more complex), and this will be explored in future work.
Results/Discussion
The results for different values of b are given in Table 1,
showing that a unique, ubiquitous social norm emerges from
these extensive numerical simulations. This norm is of second-
order, which means that all that matters is the action of the
donor and the reputation of the receiver. In other words,
even when individuals are equipped with higher cognitive
capacities, they rely on a simple norm as a key for
evolutionary success. In a nutshell, helping a good individual
or refusing help to a bad individual leads to a good
reputation, whereas refusing help to a good individual or
helping a bad one leads to a bad reputation. Moreover, we
find that the final norm is independent of the specifics of the
second-level selection mechanism, i.e., different second-level
selection mechanisms will alter the rate of convergence, but
not the equilibrium state. In this sense, we conjecture that
more realistic procedures will lead to the same dominant
norm.
The success and simplicity of this norm relies on never
being morally dubious: to each type of encounter, there is one
GOOD move and one BAD one. Moreover, it is always possible
for anyone to be promoted to the best standard possible in a
single move. Conversely, one bad move will be readily
punished [29,30] with the reduction of the player’s score.
This prompt forgiving and implacable punishment leads us to
call this norm stern-judging.
Long before the seminal work of Nowak and Sigmund [6],
several social norms have been proposed as a means to
promote (economic) cooperation. Notable examples are the
standing norm, proposed by Sugden [8], and the norm
proposed by Kandori [9], as a means to allow community
enforcement of cooperation. When translated into the
present formulation, standing constitutes a third-order norm,
whereas a fixed-order reduction of the social norm proposed
by Kandori (of variable order, dependent on the benefit-to-
cost ratio of cooperation) would correspond to stern-judging.
Indeed, in the context of community enforcement, one can
restate stern-judging as: ‘‘Help good people and refuse help
otherwise, and we shall be nice to you; otherwise, you will be
punished.’’
It is, therefore, most interesting that the exhaustive search
carried out by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [13,15] in the space of up to
third-order norms found that these two previously proposed
norms were part of the so-called leading-eight norms of
Figure 2. Norm Complexity
The higher the order (and complexity) of a norm, the more ‘‘inner’’ layers
it acquires. The outer layer stipulates the donor’s new reputation based
on the three different reputation/action combinations aligned radially
layer by layer: inward, the first layer identifies the action of the donor.
The second layer identifies the reputation of the recipient; the third the
reputation of the donor. Out of the 28 possible norms, the highly
symmetric norm shown as the outer layer emerges as the most
successful norm. Indeed, stern-judging renders the inner layer (donor
reputation) irrelevant in determining the new reputation of the donor.
This can be trivially confirmed by the symmetry of the figure with respect
to the equatorial plane (not taking the inner layer into account, of
course). All norms of second order will exhibit this symmetry, although
the combinations of 1 and 0 bits will be, in general, different. We use this
representation in Protocol S1 to depict other popular norms, namely, the
leading-eight, standing, simple-standing, and image-scoring.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020178.g002
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cooperation. On the other hand, image-score, the norm
emerging from the work of Nowak and Sigmund [6], which
has the attractive feature of being a simple, second-order
norm (like stern-judging) does not belong to the leading-eight.
Indeed, the features of image-scoring have been carefully
studied in comparison with standing [7,16,17], showing that
standing performs better than image-scoring, mostly in the
presence of errors [12].
Among the leading-eight norms discovered by Ohtsuki and
Iwasa [13,15], only stern-judging [10] and the so-called simple-
standing [31] constitute second-order norms (see below). Our
present results clearly indicate that stern-judging is favored
compared with all other norms. Nonetheless, in line with the
model considered here, the performance of each of these
norms may be evaluated by investigating how each norm
performs individually, taking into account all 16 strategies
simultaneously. In Protocol S1, we carry out such comparison:
we consider standing among the third-order norms, as well as
stern-judging, image-scoring, and simple-standing among second-
order norms. Note that, in spite of fixating the norm, errors
of assessment and of implementation as well as errors of
strategy update are taken into account. The results show that
the overall performance of stern-judging is better than that of
the other norms over a wide range of values of the benefit b.
Furthermore, both standing and simple-standing perform very
similarly, again pointing out that reputation-based coopera-
tion can successfully be established without resorting to
higher-order (more sophisticated) norms. Finally, image-
scoring performs considerably worse than all the other norms,
a feature already addressed [7,16,17]. Within the space of
second-order norms, similar conclusions have been found
recently by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [31]. Note, however, that the
result obtained here is stronger than the analysis carried out
in Protocol S1, since stern-judging emerges as the most
successful norm surviving selection and mutation with other
norms, irrespective of the selection mechanism. In other
words, stern-judging’s simplicity and robustness to errors may
contribute to its evolutionary success, since other well-
performing strategies may succumb to invasion of individuals
from other tribes who bring along strategies that may affect
the overall performance of a given tribe. In this sense,
robustness plays a key role when evolutionary success is at
stake. We believe that stern-judging is the most robust norm
promoting cooperation.
The present result correlates nicely with the recent findings
in e-trade, where simple, reputation-based mechanisms
ensure high levels of cooperation. Indeed, stern-judging
involves a straightforward and unambiguous reputation
assessment, decisions of the donor being contingent only on
the previous reputation of the receiver. We argue that the
absence of constraining environments acting upon the
potential customers in e-trade, for whom the decision of
buying or not buying is free from further ado, facilitates the
adoption of a stern-judging assessment rule. Indeed, recent
experiments [32] have shown that humans are very sensitive
to the presence of subtle, psychologically constraining cues,
their generosity depending strongly on the presence or
absence of such cues. Furthermore, under simple unambig-
uous norms, humans may escape the additional costs of
conscious deliberation [33].
As conjectured by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [13] (cf. also [5,23]),
group selection might constitute the key element in establish-
ing cooperation as a viable trait. The present results show
that even when more sophisticated selection mechanisms
operate between tribes, the outcome of evolution still favors
stern-judging as the most successful norm under which
cooperative strategies may flourish.
Materials and Methods
We considered sets of 64 tribes, each tribe with 64 inhabitants.
Each individual engages in a single round of the following indirect
reciprocity game [10] with every other tribe inhabitant, assuming with
equal probability the role of donor or recipient. The donor decides
YES or NO, if she will provide help to the recipient, following her
individual strategy encoded as a 4-bit string [12–14] (which takes into
account the current donor and recipient status—see Protocol S1). If
YES, then her payoff decreases by 1, while the recipient’s payoff
increases by b . 1. If NO, the payoffs remain unchanged (following
common practice [6,12,14,16,21], we increase the payoff of every
interacting player by 1 in every round to avoid negative payoffs). This
action will be witnessed by a third-party individual, who, based on the
tribe’s social norm, will ascribe (subject to some small error
probability la ¼ 0.001) a new reputation to the donor, which we
assume to spread efficiently without errors to the rest of the
individuals in that tribe [12–14]. Moreover, individuals may fail to
do what their strategy compels them to do, with a small execution
error probability le ¼ 0.001. After all interactions take place, one
generation has passed, simultaneously for all tribes. Individual
strategies in each tribe replicate to the next generation in the
following way: for every individual A in the population, we select an
individual B proportional to fitness (including A) [12]. The strategy of
B replaces that of A, apart from bit mutations occurring with a small
probability ls¼ 0.01. Subsequently, with probability pCONFLICT¼ 0.01,
all pairs of tribes may engage in a conflict, in which each tribe acts as
an individual unit. Different types of conflicts between tribes have
been considered.
Imitation selection. We compare the average payoffs PA and PB of
the two conflicting tribes A and B, the winner being the tribe with
highest score.
Moran process. In this case the selection method between tribes
mimics that used between individuals in each tribe; one tribe B is
chosen at random, and its norm is replaced by that of another tribe A
chosen proportional to fitness.
Table 1. Emerging Social Norm
b Imitation Dynamics Moran Pairwise Comparison* War of Attrition Hawk–Dove*
2 1001 1001 101 1001 1001 1001   1001 1001
3 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001
For each value of the benefit b (c¼ 1), each column displays the 8-bit norm emerging from the analysis of 500 simulations employing the selection method between tribes indicated as
column headers. Irrespective of the type of selection, the resulting norm that emerges is always compatible with stern-judging. Details of the different selection processes are given in the
Methods section (those marked with an * are provided in Protocol S1). For the pairwise comparison rule, the inverse temperature used was b¼ 105 (strong selection, cf. Protocol S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020178.t001
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War of attrition. We choose at random two tribes A and B with
average payoffs PA and PB. We assume that each tribe can display its
strength for a time, which is an increasing function of its average
payoff. To this end, we draw two random numbers, RA and RB, each
following an exponential probability distribution given by exp(t/PA )/
PA and exp(t/PB )/PB, respectively. The larger of the two numbers
identifies the winning tribe.
As a result of inter-tribe conflict (two additional conflicts are
discussed in Protocol S1), the norm of the losing tribe (B) is shifted in
the direction of the victor norm (A). Convergence of such a nonlinear
evolutionary process dictates a smooth norm crossover. Hence, each
bit of norm A will replace the corresponding bit of norm B with
probability
p ¼ gPA
gPA þ ð1 gÞPB
which ensures good convergence whenever g  0.2, independently of
the type of conflict (a bit mutation probability lN¼ 0.0001 has been
used). Furthermore, a small fraction of the population of tribe A
replaces a corresponding random fraction of tribe B: each individual
of tribe A replaces a corresponding individual of tribe B with a
probability lmigration ¼ 0.005. Indeed, if no migration takes place, a
tribe’s population may get trapped in less cooperative strategies,
compromising the global convergence of the evolutionary process
[26].
Each simulation runs for 9,000 generations, starting from
randomly assigned strategies and norms, to let the system reach a
stationary situation, typically characterized by all tribes having
maximized their average payoff, for a given benefit b . c ¼ 1. The
subsequent 1,000 generations are then used to collect information on
the strategies used in each tribe and the norms ruling the tribes in the
stationary regime. We ran 500 evolutions for each value of b,
subsequently performing a statistical analysis of the bits that encode
each norm, as detailed before.
The results presented are quite robust to variations of the different
mutation rates introduced above, as well as to variation of population
size and number of tribes. Furthermore, reducing the threshold from
98% to 95% does not introduce any changes in the results shown.
Supporting Information
Protocol S1. Supplementary Information
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020178.sd001 (1.0 MB DOC).
Acknowledgments
JMP would like to thank Yoh Iwasa and Hisashi Ohtsuki for helpful
discussions.
Author contributions. JMP, FCS, and FACCC conceived and
designed the experiments, performed the experiments, analyzed the
data, and wrote the paper.
Funding. JMP acknowledges support from FCT, Portugal, and the
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics at Harvard University. FCS
acknowledges the support of COMP2SYS, a Marie Curie Early Stage
Training Site, funded by the European Community through the HRM
activity. FACCC was supported by project POCI/MAT/57546/2004.
Competing interests. The authors have declared that no competing
interests exist.
References
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